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COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 5, No. 26 March 29, 1969

THE SECRETARY AND THE GENERAL—Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force (left), is briefed by Gen. William W. Momyer, commander of Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Va., during visit to the Virginia base.

Budget Changes Unveiled by Defense Secretary

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird unveiled revised figures for the FY 1969 Supplemental and FY 1970 budgets during March 19 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee and also gave the lawmakers his views on the Vietnam situation.

On the subject of Vietnam, Secretary Laird told the lawmakers he regretted to report ". . . that I see no indication that we presently have a program adequate to bring about a significant reduction in the U. S. military contribution in South Vietnam . . ."

A moment later Secretary Laird added: ". . . Also, the presentation given to me by the MACV Staff was based on the premise that no reduction in U.S. personnel would be possible in the absence of total withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops."

Secretary Laird said he had come to the conclusion that Phase II in the Vietnam modernization program should be started this year. Phase II calls for the development of indigenous forces which would be capable of suppressing insurgency on their

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ABM Data Is Revealed To Public

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird went back to Capitol Hill March 21 to continue his testimony on the Safeguard ABM System.

In his statement before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Laird asked the question "Why deploy an ABM System at all?"

He then provided an answer after explaining that he was including information that had "heretofore largely remained classified and unrevealed."

The Secretary said the decision (ABM deployment) is so crucial ". . . that President Nixon and I have decided to make the maximum possible amount of this information public, so that each Senator, each Congressman and indeed, each individual American can have available the necessary facts on which to make his or her own individual judgment."

The Secretary said that simply continuing research and development on ABM, without any initial deployment, "would leave us with no option to provide defense for our deterrent on the schedule that might be required by the Soviet threat if we do not reach an agreement with the Soviets on limiting strategic forces."

The Safeguard System, then, is designed to be responsive to the threat if and as it materializes, he said.

The potential threat from the Soviet Union, Secretary Laird pointed out, lies in the growing force of missiles which could destroy a portion of our own deterrent, or retaliatory forces.

"We cannot stop a massive Soviet attack on our cities; technically we just don't know how," he said.

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Defense Secretary Reveals Secret Data in Testimony

(Continued from Page 1)

Continuing his explanation, Secretary Laird said the U.S. must rely on deterrence to insure that nuclear war doesn't start in the first place.

"In order to deter an attack we must be positive—and the Soviet government must be positive—that a substantial number of our long range missiles and bombers will survive any attack and then destroy the attacker as a modern society. The Soviet Union today is building at a rapid rate the kinds of weapons which could be used to erode our essential deterrent force," Secretary Laird testified.

Later in his statement, Secretary Laird said:

"Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to be very clear about what I am talking about. There should be no mistake about our capabilities today or about the credibility of our deterrent today.

"We have sufficient strength today in the combination of our strategic forces—our missiles, our bombers and our Polaris capability—to respond to any attack that might be launched against the United States.

"As Secretary of Defense," he continued, "it is my obligation and my intention to keep it that way beyond any reasonable doubt. This is what this ABM discussion is all about."

He said that is why "we have no alternative but to protect our options to safeguard our deterrent forces. If the Soviet threat turns out to be, as the evidence now strongly indicates, an attempt to erode our deterrent capability, we must be in a position to convince them that a first strike would always involve unacceptable risks.

"As I indicated earlier," the Secretary said, "the option of safeguarding our deterrent forces against the potential threat cannot be preserved by research and development alone."

NUMBER 100,000—Second Lieutenant James W. Hickey is the 100,000th graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School, Ft. Benning, Ga.

Budget Changes Unveiled by Defense Secretary

(Continued from Page 1)

own if North Vietnamese and U.S. forces were withdrawn.

He explained that the over-all modernization program (Phase I and Phase II) called for Phase I (the maximum possible indigenous land forces combat capability, assuming continued U.S. participation in the war at the then current level) to receive $1.1 billion in the budget request transmitted to Congress in January.

The Secretary said no funds were included in the January budget for Phase II, ". . . because, I am informed, the requirements had not yet been defined." He proposed to add about $36 million in FY 1969 and approximately $120 million in FY 1970 for this purpose.

Discussing his new budget figures, Secretary Laird said the net change in New Obligational Authority is minus $141 million in FY 1969 and minus $2,170 million in FY 1970, for a total net reduction of about $2,311 million in the two years. The net change in the amounts requested for Authorization in FY 1970 is minus $726 million.

Total Defense Department Outlays are now estimated at $78.4 billion in FY 1969 (the same as in the January budget) and $78.5 billion in FY 1970 ($500 million less than in the January budget).

Other highlights of Secretary Laird's testimony included:

1. A decision to cut off the FB-111 program at four squadrons (to salvage "what we can of the work now in progress") and concentrate "our efforts on the development of a new strategic bomber, AMSA. The FB-111 will not meet the requirements for a true intercontinental bomber and the cost per unit has reached a point where an AMSA must be considered to fill the void."

2. Plans to hold Minuteman III production at a lower rate through the FY 1970 funding period, increasing to a higher rate in FY 1971 if all goes well. This will permit a reduction of $135 million in the FY 1970 budget request.

3. A determination to minimize cost overruns resulting from R&D modifications after production has commenced. Secretary Laird told the committee the cost overrun problem "is a particularly thorny one." He then added: "When I discovered the extensive cost overruns in the shipbuilding program, I immediately ordered a check for overruns in other programs. Based on my initial investigation, we found a total of between $1 and $1.2 billion in other cost overruns. This includes, for example, the Army's Cheyenne program, the Air Force's C-5 and F-111 A/E/D programs, and additional overruns in the Navy's programs other than shipbuilding."

4. The original FY 1970 budget provided for the inactivation of five Air National Guard air defense units and the conversion of two airlift units to other, unspecified, missions. A decision has been made to convert all seven of the Air National Guard units to other missions as follows: one Tactical Air Support, two Air Refueling, two C-141 Associate, one F-100 Tactical Fighter, and one F-100 Combat Crew Training.

Department of Defense

SUMMARY - FY 1970 BUDGET REVISIONS
(Amounts in thousand dollars)

Appropriation Title	1970 Budget estimate	Recommended change (+ or -)	Amended estimate
Military Construction			
Military Construction, Army	1,037,500	-641,900	395,600
Military Construction, Navy	398,400	-1,100	397,300
Military Construction, Air Force	385,300	+8,800	394,100
Military Construction, Defense Agencies	74,500	-	74,500
Military Construction, Army Reserve	10,000	-	10,000
Military Construction, Naval Reserve	9,600	-	9,600
Military Construction, Air Force Reserve	5,300	-	5,300
Military Construction, Army Nat'l. Guard	15,000	-	15,000
Military Construction, Air Nat'l. Guard	13,200	-	13,200
Total - Military Construction	1,948,800	-634,200	1,314,600
Family Housing			
Family Housing, Defense	607,800	-	607,800
Homeowners Assistance Fund, Defense	9,700	-1,850	7,850
Total - Family Housing	617,500	-1,850	615,650
Civil Defense			
Operation and Maintenance, Civil Defense	50,700	-	50,700
Research Shelter Survey & Marking, CD	24,600	-	24,600
Total - Civil Defense	75,300	-	75,300
Budget Concepts Adjustments			
Trust funds	7,429	-	7,429
Intragovernmental transactions	-7,200	-	-7,200
Applicable receipts	-144,507	-	-144,507
Total - Budget Concepts Adjustments	-144,278	-	-144,278
Grand Total - Military Functions, NOA	80,237,522	-2,170,150	78,067,372
Military Assistance			
Military Assistance, Executive	375,000	-	375,000
Foreign Military Credit Sales, Executive	275,000	-	275,000
MAP Trust fund	750,000	-	750,000
MAP applicable receipts	-992,325	-	-992,325
Total - Military Assistance	407,675	-	407,675
Total - Department of Defense, NOA	80,645,197	-2,170,150	78,475,047

The President's ABM Decision

"VITAL FOR U.S. SECURITY AND WORLD PEACE"

At a televised White House press conference on March 14 President Nixon announced a major policy decision which, he said, "I believe is vital for the security and defense of the United States and also in the interests of peace throughout the world."

Recommending adoption of a modified Sentinel anti-ballistic missile program, he pointed out that "this decision has not been an easy one. None of the great decisions made by a President are easy."

The ABM program "has been the subject of very strong debate and controversy over the past few months," the President said, and described the new plan as "a safeguard program." The new program calls for beginning "a measured construction of an active defense of our retaliatory forces." Missile and radar sites would not be placed close to major cities. Below are excerpts from the President's statement and press conference.

Immediately after assuming office, I requested the Secretary of Defense to review the program initiated by the last Administration to deploy the Sentinel Ballistic Missile Defense System.

The Department of Defense presented a full statement of the alternatives at the last two meetings of the National Security Council. These alternatives were reviewed there in the light of the security requirements of the U.S., and of their probable impact on East-West relations, with particular reference to the prospects for strategic arms negotiations.

After carefully considering the alternatives, I have reached the following conclusions: (1) the concept on which the Sentinel program of the previous Administration was based should be substantially modified, (2) the safety of our country requires that we should proceed now with the development and construction of the new system in a carefully phased program, (3) this program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of (a) technical developments, (b) the threat, (c) the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation.

The modified system has been designed so that its defensive intent is unmistakable. It will be implemented not according to some fixed, theoretical schedule, but in a manner clearly related to our periodic analysis of the threat.

The Objectives

[The] measured deployment is designed to fulfill three objectives:

1. Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.

2. Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.

3. Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source.

The Risks

Giving up all construction of missile defense poses too many risks. Research and Development does not supply the answer to many technical issues that only operational experience can provide. The Soviet Union has engaged in a build-up of its strategic forces larger than was envisaged in 1967 when the decision to deploy Sentinel was made. The following is illustrative of recent Soviet activity:

1. The Soviets have already deployed an ABM system which protects to some degree a wide area centered around Moscow. We will not have a comparable capability for over four years. We believe the Soviet Union is continuing their ABM development, directed either toward improving this initial system, or more likely, making substantially better second-generation ABM components.

2. The Soviet Union is continuing the deployment of very large missiles with warheads capable of destroying our hardened Minuteman forces.

3. The Soviet Union has also been substantially increasing the size of their submarine-launched ballistic missile force.

4. The Soviets appear to be developing a semi-orbital nuclear weapon system.

In addition to these developments, the Chinese threat against our population, as well as the danger of an accidental attack, cannot be ignored. By approving this system, it is possible to reduce U.S. fatalities to a minimal level in the event of a Chinese nuclear attack in the 1970's, or in an accidental attack from any source.

The gravest responsibility which I bear as President of the United States is for the security of the Nation. Our nuclear forces defend not only ourselves but our Allies as well. The imperative that our nuclear deterrent remain secure beyond any possible doubt requires that the

U.S. must take steps now to insure that our strategic retaliatory forces will not become vulnerable to a Soviet attack.

From Confrontation to Negotiation

In making this decision, I have been mindful of my pledge to make every effort to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. The program I am recommending is based on a careful assessment of the developing Soviet and Chinese threats.

I have directed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—a non-partisan group of distinguished private citizens—to make a yearly assessment of the threat which will supplement our regular intelligence assessment. Each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than that required by the threat existing at that time. Moreover, we will take maximum advantage of the information gathered from the initial deployment in designing the later phases of the program.

Since our deployment is to be closely related to the threat, it is subject to modification as the threat changes, either through negotiations or through unilateral actions by the Soviet Union or Communist China.

The program is not provocative. The Soviet retaliatory capability is not affected by our decision. The capability for surprise attack against our strategic forces is reduced. In other words, our program provides an incentive for a responsible Soviet weapons policy and for the avoidance of spiraling U.S. and Soviet strategic arms budgets.

I have taken cognizance of the view that beginning construction of a U.S. ballistic missile defense would complicate an agreement on strategic arms with the Soviet Union.

I do not believe that the evidence of the recent past bears out this contention. The Soviet interest in strategic talks was not deterred by the decision of the previous Administration to deploy the Sentinel ABM system—in fact, it was formally announced shortly afterwards. I believe that the modifications we have made in the previous program will give the Soviet Union even less reason to view our defense effort as an obstacle to talks. Moreover, I wish to emphasize that in any arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, the United States will be fully prepared to discuss limitations on defensive as well as offensive weapons systems.

Following are some of the questions asked at the President's news conference:

Russian Reaction

Q: Mr. President, do you have reason to believe that the Russians will interpret your ABM decision today as not being an escalating move in the arms race?

A: As a matter of fact . . . I have reason to believe, based on the past record, that they would interpret it just the other way around.

First, when they deployed their own ABM system—and, as you know, they have 67 missile ABM sites deployed around Moscow—they rejected the idea that it escalated the arms race on the ground that it was defensive solely in character; and second, when the United States last year went forward on the Sentinel system, four days later the Soviet Union initiated the opportunity to have arms limitation talks.

I think the Soviet Union recognizes very clearly the difference between a defensive posture and an offensive posture.

I would also point this out, an interesting thing about Soviet military and diplomatic history: They have always thought in defensive terms, and if you read not only their political leaders, but their military leaders, the emphasis is on defense.

I think that since this system now . . . makes it so clearly defensive in character that the Soviet Union cannot interpret this as escalating the arms race.

Arms Talks

Q: In any talks with the Soviet Union, would you be willing to consider abandoning the ABM program, altogether if the Soviets showed a similar willingness or indeed, if they showed a readiness to place limitations on offensive weapons?

A: I am prepared, in the event that we go into arms talks, to consider both offensive and defensive weapons. As you know, the arms talks, that at least preliminarily have been discussed, do not involve limitations or reduction. They involve only freezing where we are.

Your question goes to abandoning. On that particular point, I think it would take two, naturally, to make the agreement. Let's look at the Soviet Union's position with its defensive deployment of ABMs. Previously, that deployment was aimed only toward the United States. Today their radars, from our intelligence, are also directed toward Communist China.

I would imagine that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat. So the abandoning of the entire system, particularly as long as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon with much favor.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Q: Mr. President, do you think these developments of the Soviet Union and the United States are compatible with the aims of the NPT?

A: I believe that they are compatible with the NPT. . . . This kind of defensive system, which enables the United States of America to make its deterrent capability credible, . . . will have an enormous effect in reducing the pressure on the other countries who might want to acquire nuclear weapons.

Military, Civilians Get Gun Control Regulations

Three government agencies have coordinated instructions for disseminating Internal Revenue regulations on the importation of privately owned firearms and ammunition by Defense Department military and civilian personnel.

The instructions hinge for the most part on the Gun Control Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-618) effective Oct. 22, 1968, and have been approved by the Internal Revenue Service (Treasury), Department of Defense and the Bureau of Customs. The authority for importation restrictions outlined in these instructions is contained in this Act and not in regulations generated by the Armed Services.

Procedures and requirements for military personnel are somewhat different than they are for civilians. For example, a military member on active duty abroad or Rod and Gun Clubs recognized by the Defense Department, are authorized under the Gun Control Act of 1968 to have firearms and ammunition generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes and intended for the personal use of such member or club, shipped from a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer to such member or club abroad.

This includes firearms purchased by a military member through post exchanges, ships stores, or base exchanges from licensed dealers in the U.S. This does not apply where weapons are prohibited under existing military regulations. Military members are authorized to import into the U.S. firearms and ammunition that qualify under existing regulations, providing necessary proof is furnished their commanding officer—or his duly designated representative—that will permit compliance with regulations.

But it should be remembered that ons are prohibited under existing military member and then transferred to another member on active duty abroad will require an import permit as outlined by regulation before the firearm can be shipped back into the U.S.

Firearms previously taken out of the U.S. or possession by a civilian employee may be imported into the U.S. by the employee provided the supporting Form DD 1252 contains a certificate outlined in existing regulations.

CHANGE OF COMMAND — RAdm. John G. Dillon (left) receives the colors and command of the Third Naval Construction Brigade in Vietnam from RAdm. James V. Bartlett.

Firearms currently in possession of civilian employees in the overseas area which were not previously taken overseas by such employee but were acquired abroad, may not personally be imported by a civilian employee. However, a civilian employee may arrange importation of authorized firearms by making arrangements with a licensed dealer within the State of residence of the employee who may act as an agent for the employee. Such licensed dealer will apply to IRS for permit for importation on behalf of the employee.

This prohibition includes weapons purchased overseas prior to, on or after Dec. 6, 1968. It also includes weapons purchased abroad by civilian employees through Rod and Gun Clubs, post exchanges, ships stores or base exchanges.

Prior to the Gun Control Act, both military and persons accompanying the armed forces overseas were authorized to import war trophy firearms, but the new Gun Control Act authorizes importation of war trophy firearms by military members only. Antique firearms are exempt from the provision of the Gun Control Act.

Following are definitions of terms which apply beginning Oct. 22, 1968. It should be noted that unless previously taken overseas all personally owned firearms and ammunition authorized to be imported into the U.S. must be generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes and intended for the personal use of the owner.

Prohibited Firearms: 1—a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length; 2—A weapon made from a shotgun if such weapon as modified has an over-all length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length; 3—A rifle having a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; 4—A weapon made from a rifle if such weapon as modified has an over-all length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; 5—Any other weapon as defined in the "any other weapon category"; 6—A machine gun; 7—A muffler or a silencer for any firearm whether or not such firearm is included within this definition; 8—a destructive device.

Antique Firearms: 1—Any firearm (including any firearm with a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system) manufactured on or before 1898; 2—Any replica of the above type if it is not designed or redesigned for using rimfire or conventional centerfire fixed ammunition; 3—No permit is required for the importation of an antique firearm since they are exempt from the provision of the Gun Control Act.

Ammunition: Ammunition or cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or propellant powder designed for use in any firearm. Documentation requirements for ammunition are the same as for firearms.

Destructive Device: Any explosive, incendiary or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces.

Weapons System Advances Depend on Individuals

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. McConnell has long had the conviction that every advance in our sophisticated weapons systems must be accompanied by measures to insure the qualitative superiority of the individuals who operate and maintain them.

Speaking before the Personnel Symposium of the Air Force Association Convention in Houston, Tex., March 20, he said, "It is my belief that notwithstanding all the textbook rules for good personnel management, the single factor of leadership is the fundamental element of success in programs that affect people."

Gen. McConnell said he had directed that the Air Force adopt "a golden rule of leadership"—a rule requiring all supervisors in the Air Force to treat their subordinates in the same way those supervisors expect to be treated by their superiors.

"In the exercise of leadership, every one of us must be fair and impartial. Further, we must display unquestioned integrity and clearly demonstrate a sincere interest in those working for us.

"Only in this way can we expect to increase the attractiveness of service life to the point required for maintaining a superior force of dedicated professionals," he said.

Gen. McConnell said that in May 1956 he directed that an effort placing greater emphasis on people be initiated. He said then, as now, the improvements sought through this program could best be considered and supported within two general categories: "First, there were those steps which required legislation and money, and second, there were those actions which we could take within our own resources.

"Under that first category, I believe that we have made considerable progress in the legislative arena, particularly in the matter of pay. We have also made substantial progress in the second or 'self-help' category. But it is the area which still demands the greater share of our attention because it involves every member of the Air Force."

PORTRAIT—A portrait of Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. McConnell, painted by MSgt. Harold E. McCaughey, Randolph AFB, Tex., is presented to Gen. McConnell. Lt. Gen. John W. Carpenter, III, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, USAF, and Maj. Gen. Robert J. Dixon, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for Military Personnel and Commander, USAF Military Personnel Center, look on.

The Air Force chief said we should recognize that no segment of our force—military or civilian—is more important than the other. "However, the keystone to effective military organization is decisive military direction. The exercise of command is a continuing challenge, and the difficulties encountered can be resolved only by intelligent and discriminating application of command prerogatives. This applies to commanders and supervisors at all echelons," he said.

Gen. McConnell said he has urged his commanders to act independently in emphasizing these elements of leadership together with the other long-standing and basic precepts that are implicit in the 1965 program. "I asked, moreover, that the total spectrum of personnel management be examined thoroughly at each echelon to insure that we were not missing a trick."

He said, in order to gain support for those personnel measures that are beyond our immediate control, "I have asked my commanders for detailed recommendations. I am happy to say that these recommendations have provided valuable insights as the basis for real progress, especially in our assignment policies.

"Here we have been able to minimize the impact of involuntary second tours in South Vietnam. We have done this through scrupulous adherence to the policy that all overseas assignments would be made according to standard selection criteria, and without regard to so-called indispensability or rank.

"This illustrates the way in which our feedback of detailed recommendations is providing a new order of ideas on how we can further improve the lot of the individual in the Air Force."

It May Take Years to Solve Draft Problem

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard believes it will take several years—and a good deal of discussion—before the draft problem is solved, but is convinced that one of the first things that should be done is to remove some of the injustice from it.

"I don't know whether a lottery is the right argument or not, but certainly the present system is not very good," Mr. Packard told newsmen on a television show Mar. 16.

A reporter estimated that about 30 percent of the June graduates would be available for the draft and asked the Deputy Secretary of Defense if that wasn't true.

Mr. Packard acknowledged that it would be a large number, but then qualified the statement:

"What happened here," Mr. Packard said, "is that there were predictions that there would be a large number of graduate students. That didn't come about," he said, "because there were various reasons why they weren't drafted. They were in the middle of their course and so forth, and so the results so far don't indicate what the percentage is likely to be."

He said he thought there would be a larger increase in the number of graduate students at the end of this semester, adding: ". . . the answer is, our present arrangement is not a very satisfactory one and I hope we can find a better solution to this draft problem, as long as we have to have a draft."

A reporter suggested that the "big alternative" might be an over-all volunteer force, and then asked: "What progress has the Department made in its study thus far to determine whether such a force is feasible?"

Mr. Packard said there have been some studies made, but that he didn't think enough progress had been made so far to give a precise answer to the question, but he added that an all-volunteer force is feasible if you want to pay for it. "Whether it is desirable or not is another question," he said.

Asked how much an all-volunteer force would cost, Mr. Packard said, "It is difficult to get an accurate evaluation of the cost because it is hard to know how many of the present volunteers are draft-induced volunteers. A large portion, we think, are. I am sure there are some things that the services could do to make the service more attractive to keep people in the service longer. We are looking at some of those things and hope to implement them."

A questioner asked if an all-volunteer force—or professional army—could not lead to a military dictatorship in the U.S., and Mr. Packard answered: "Well, we know, as you know, the civilian controls the military here; I think that it is a very important part of the American way to do it.

"I would hope," he continued, "that if we find we have to go, or do want to go, to an all-volunteer force, that it can be done without the hazard that you outlined."

DECORATED FOR HEROISM—Lt. Gen. Harry H. Critz (left), Fourth U.S. Army commander, presents Silver Star and Bronze Star Medals to Maj. James N. Rowe, at Brooke Army Medical Center, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex. Maj. Rowe escaped from the Viet Cong after five years' imprisonment and assisted U.S. Forces in launching an immediate and damaging attack against the enemy.

Commanders Digest

Index Number 2

Coming Next Week

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

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